





















































use	u	we	pretend	that	‘Holmes1’	refers	to	a	man,	but	it	doesn’t	really.	So	we	can	say	that,	in	this	case,	there	is	no	use	u	of	‘Holmes1’	such	that	the	name	refers	to	a	man—which	just	is	the	no	reference	view	(provided	that	the	name	doesn’t	refer	to	anything	else,	either).	That	Kripke’s	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view	is	important	in	Salmon’s	objection,	because	Salmon	thinks	having	a	view	on	which	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	no	reference	is	subject	to	criticism.		Salmon’s	view	departs	from	Kripke’s	because	Salmon	thinks	that	having	a	view	that	allows	there	to	be	sentences	in	which	no	proposition	is	expressed	is	problematic.	Salmon	(1998:	297)	says	that	“this	renders	the	meaningfulness	of	true-meta	fictional	sentences	like	‘According	to	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories,	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	problematic	and	mysterious.”	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	can	be	formulated	in	the	following	manner:		(P1)		 The	pretend	reference	view	is	true.	(Assumption	for	reductio.)	(P2)	 If	the	pretend	reference	view	is	true,	then	the	no	reference	view	is	true.		(C1)	 The	no	reference	view	is	true.		(From	(P1)	&	(P2).)	The	no	reference	view	says	that	whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.	(P3)		 If	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	a	referent,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.		(C2)		 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.	(From	(C1)	&	(P3).)	(P4)		 (1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	it	expresses	something.	
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(C3)	 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”	(From	(C2)	&	(P4).)	(P5)		 (2)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”		(C4)	 (2)	isn’t	true.	(From	(C3)	&	(P5).)	(P6)		 Intuitively	(2)	is	true.			(C5)		 The	pretend	reference	view	is	false.	(From	(P1),	(C4)	&	(P6)	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.)			For	this	argument,	Salmon	assumes	that	Kripke’s	view	is	true	so	that	he	can	show	how	what	follows	from	the	view	cannot	turn	out	to	be	right.	As	I	mentioned,	the	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view;	on	the	no	reference	view	there	is	no	use	of	the	name	‘Holmes1’	on	which	the	view	refers	to	a	man	or	anything	else.	In	the	discussion	of	Kripke’s	view,	we	saw	that	(P3)	is	true;	Kripke	argues	that,	if	a	name	has	no	referent,	like	‘Holmes1’,	then	sentences	in	which	that	name	occurs	express	no	proposition.	(C2)	follows,	then,	because	the	nonreferring	name	‘Holmes1’	occurs	in	sentence	(1),	so	it	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.		Salmon	argues	that	(P4)	is	true;	sentences	are	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	they	express	something.	(C3)	follows;	(1)	does	not	express	a	proposition,	and	sentences	can	be	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	they	express	a	proposition,	so	it	is	no	the	case	that	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”	(P5)	is	true,	because	Salmon	argues	that	(2)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(1)	is	true	with	respect	to	the	fiction,	and	(1)	isn’t	true	with	respect	to	the	fiction,	so	(2)	isn’t	true.	But	(P6)	is	correct;	(2)	is	true.	It	is	obvious	that	(2)	is	true	and,	if	we	were	asked	to	mark	the	sentence	‘Holmes1	
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Recall	that	any	sentence	like	‘Sherlock	Holmes	plays	the	violin’	can	be	interpreted	in	four	different	ways:		(1) 				Holmes1	plays	the	violin.	(2) 				According	to	the	stories,	Holmes1	plays	the	violin.	(3) 				Holmes2	plays	the	violin.	(4) 				According	to	the	stories,	Holmes2	plays	the	violin.	A	key	feature	of	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke’s	view	is	that	Kripke’s	view	entails	the	no	reference	view.	It	turns	out,	though,	that	Salmon’s	views	both	entail	the	no	reference	view	as	well.		On	the	no	reference	view,	whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	n	refers	to	something.	On	the	pretend	use	view,	there	is	a	name	‘Holmes1’	but	we	only	pretend	that	there	is	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	the	name	in	that	way	it	refers	to	a	man.	On	the	pretend	name	view	the	author	pretends	there	is	a	name	and	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	the	name	in	that	way	it	refers	to	a	man.	In	neither	case	is	there	a	use	of	the	name	‘Holmes1’	on	which	it	refers	to	something,	so	both	views	entail	the	no	reference	view.	This	is	a	problem	for	Salmon.	Here	is	how	Salmon’s	argument	against	Kripke’s	view	can	be	used	against	Salmon’s	own	views:				(P1*)	 Either	the	pretend	use	view	or	the	pretend	name	view	is	true.	(Assumption	for	reductio.)	(P2*)	 If	either	the	pretend	use	view	or	the	pretend	name	view	is	true,	then	the	no	reference	view	is	true.		(C1)	 The	no	reference	view	is	true.	(From	(P1*)	&	(P2*).)	The	no	reference	view	says	that	whenever	an	author	originally	introduces	what	looks	
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like	a	name	from	fiction,	n,	there	is	no	use,	u,	such	that	when	we	use	n	on	u	the	name	refers	to	something.	(P3)		 If	it	is	not	the	case	that	the	name	‘Holmes1’	has	a	referent,	then	it	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.		(C2)		 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	expresses	a	proposition.	(From	(C1)	&	(P3).)	(P4)		 (1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction”	only	if	it	expresses	something.	(C3)	 It	is	not	the	case	that	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”	(From	(C2)	&	(P4).)	(P5)		 	(2)	is	true	if	and	only	if	(1)	is	true	“with	respect	to	the	fiction.”		(C4)	 	(2)	isn’t	true.	(From	(C3)	&	(P5).)	(P6)		 Intuitively,	(2)	is	true.			(C5*)	 The	pretend	reference	view	and	the	pretend	name	view	are	false.		(From	(P1*),	(C4)	&	(P6)	by	reductio	ad	absurdum.)			As	earlier	mentioned,	that	Salmon	thinks	Kripke’s	pretend	reference	view	entails	the	no	reference	view	is	part	of	Salmon’s	objection	to	Kripke.	Since	Conan	Doyle	only	used	the	name	‘Holmes1’	to	pretend	to	refer	to	a	man,	Salmon	is	able	to	argue	against	the	pretend	reference	view.	If	this	undermines	the	pretend	reference	view,	then	the	pretend	use	view	and	the	pretend	name	view	are	likewise	undermined.	So,	Salmon’s	view	likewise	entails	the	no	reference	view	and	can	then	be	argued	against.			 (P1*)	says	that	it	is	not	the	case	that	on	either	of	Salmon’s	views	‘Holmes1’	refers.	If	on	neither	view	there	is	a	referent	for	the	name			‘Holmes1’,	then	both	views	entail	the	no	reference	view;	it	is	not	the	case	(on	
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either	view)	that	there	is	a	name,	‘Holmes1’,	and	a	use	such	that	when	we	use	‘Holmes1’	on	that	use	it	refers	to	the	man	and	detective	Sherlock	Holmes,	or	to	anything	else.	If	(P1*)	is	right,	then	the	rest	of	Salmon’s	own	argument	follows	and	we	can	conclude	that	there	is	no	reason	to	prefer	Salmon’s	view	over	Kripke’s	in	the	face	of	this	argument.			 Salmon	might	argue	that	the	pretend	use	view	and	the	pretend	name	actually	do	not	entail	the	no	reference	view.	Salmon	thinks	that	he	gets	around	the	problem	he	has	with	Kripke’s	view,	which	is	that	sentences	with	the	name	‘Holmes1’	do	not	express	propositions.	Salmon	thinks	that	there	is	never	any	genuine	use	of	‘Holmes1’	and	that	it	doesn’t	matter	if	the	name	doesn’t	refer,	because	it	is	only	the	fictional	character—whose	only	legitimate	name	‘Holmes2’—that	we	should	worry	about.	Salmon	says	that	Conan	Doyle	spun	an	elaborate	pretense	in	creating	the	Sherlock	Holmes	stories	by	pretending	to	assert	propositions.	He	argues	that	Conan	Doyle	only	pretended	to	assert	propositions	and	that	at	a	later	time	the	use	of	‘Sherlock	Holmes’	is	imported	into	reality	to	refer	to	the	fictional	character	Holmes,	whose	essence	is	based	off	of	propositions	Conan	Doyle	originally	only	pretended	to	assert.				But,	Conan	Doyle	originally	only	pretended	to	assert	propositions	in	writing	the	sentences	that	make	up	the	Holmes	stories,	then	the	sentences	do	not	express	propositions	with	respect	to	the	fiction;	these	sentences	were	never	asserted	in	a	non-pretend	way	and	therefore	do	not	have	any	legitimate	truth	value.	Salmon	thinks	that	the	essence	of	the	fictional	
	 24	
character,	Holmes,	comes	from	the	propositions	Conan	Doyle	originally	pretended	to	assert.	If	Conan	Doyle	only	pretended	to	assert	propositions	on	which	the	essence	of	the	fictional	character	is	based,	he	too	didn’t	really	assert	a	proposition.	And,	to	use	Salmon’s	own	argument	against	his	view,	if	no	proposition	is	expressed	by	(1),	then	it	is	neither	true	nor	false.		And,	if	(1)	is	neither	true	nor	false,	then	(2)	isn’t	either,	since	what	is	true	“according	to	the	fiction”	is	based	off	of	what	Conan	Doyle	pretended	to	assert	about	Holmes	(and	how	can	you	base	something	true	off	of	a	sentence	that	expresses	nothing?).	Salmon’s	view	is	no	better	than	Kripke’s,	then,	in	these	respects.			 I	have	one	last	consideration	in	objecting	to	Salmon’s	view	about	names	from	fiction.		Salmon	argues	that	his	account	of	names	from	fiction	is	better,	because	it	results	in	better	conclusions	when	considering	the	truth	of	object-fictional	and	meta-fictional	sentences.	This	is	a	bit	misleading,	though,	because	Salmon	never	explicitly	says	whether	he	is	talking	about	‘Holmes1’	or	‘Holmes2’	in	the	passage	where	he	states	this.	In	order	for	Salmon’s	account	to	be	preferable	over	Kripke’s,	it	needs	to	yield	the	results	mentioned	above,	but	about	‘Holmes1’,	not	about	‘Holmes2’.	It	seems	here,	though,	that	Salmon	is	talking	about	‘Holmes2’,	because	he	says,	as	previously	mentioned,	that,	“in	all	our	genuine	discourse	about	Holmes,	we	use	the	name	in	the	‘Holmes2’	way.”13		This	is	a	problem	for	Salmon.	If	Salmon	thinks	he	is	sidestepping	the	problem	by	saying	the	name	‘Holmes1’	(if	he	thinks	it’s																																																									13	Salmon	1998:	303.		
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even	a	name)	is	not	genuinely	ever	used	and	therefore	we	should	only	talk	about	‘Holmes2’,	then	he	isn’t	solving	the	problem	at	all.		 																				
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